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Download Files Update

Register Updates

The most recent registers have been uploaded, the delay as usual was down the the Australian Civil Aircraft Register. The register seems to update less frequently than it used to, it has been monthly for the past few months. Also included in the updates are the US Civil Aircraft Register and the Canadian Civil Aircraft Register, which along with the American Civil Aircraft Register de-registered aircraft file now totals some 730,000 records.

I have been looking at pulling together a number of other registers, while keeping the format the same. These include a number of European Civil Aircraft Registers, the Austrian Civil Aircraft Register and the Belgian Civil Aircraft Register likely to be the first two. Followed by the Britsh Civil Aircraft Register and the Dutch Civil Aircraft Register.

 

Survivors – P-51 – Mustang – USA

Surviving Mustangs

The list of surviving North American Mustangs is quite lenthy, but before delving into the survivors what is the definition of a Mustang. To understand this we need to look at the evolution of the Mustang, designed to a British specification by North American Aviation. Originally approached to Build the Curtis P-40 under licence for the British, there was agreement that a new design would be more appropriate and so the NA-73X was born. This was the original Mustang Mk I, at this point the British Purchasing Commission effectively ordered 320 off the drawing board.

Of the first batch of Mustangs, two were allocated to the USAAC – the serials allocated were 41-038 and 41-039 and the XP-51 had arrived. Originally armed with two .50 calibre guns in the nose and four .303 calibre wing mounted guns the Mustang Mk I (NA-73 and NA-83) became the Mustang Mk Ia (NA-91) in RAF service when the wing armament was changed to 4 * 20mm cannons. The a,b,c suffix being commonly used when there was a wing armaments change, particularly when changed within a version as here.

The Mustang Mk Ia was in production when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbour, the USAAC withheld a number of the 300 Mk Ia Mustangs that had been ordered and these became the P-51-2 or the F6A in USAAC service. North American Aviation at this time was closely involved in the Rolls-Royce Mustang X project, to re-engine the Mustang with the Rolls-Royce Merlin 61 as used in the Spitfire Mk IX.

The above lineage brings us to the North American Aviation P-51A Mustang, on the way there was probably much in fighting among various factions – but essentially the P-51A was arrived at through British requirements and North American Aviation technical skills and manufacturing capacity, modified by British need.

There were over fifteen thousand Mustangs built of all variants, with a number still in active service until the1980’s. They were operated by many countries, even built in countries like Australia and Canada by the Commonwealth Aircraft Corporation.

How many still survive is a difficult question to answer, I don’t doubt that I will miss a few from the list. But to minimise the chance of this, the list will be broken into sections to make it more manageable as the largest group are the US registered aircraft – here they are all 211 of them.

The table below is the current list of surviving North American Mustangs on the US register as dated the 6th of August, these are all believed to be in a flyable condition although some of them may fly infrequently.

It is quite likely that the table will change from time to time, some will be added and in the event of accidents or sale some may be deleted – I will try and keep it up to date, any help would be appreciated.

 

Support this site.

It does take some time and effort to create these downloads, also there are a number of costs associated with running the site. So if you can consider supporting this site with a donation it would be helpful, if you find the site useful then why not treat me to a doughnut – or even a doughnut and a coffee if you’re feeling really flush.

But regardless of whether you donate or not, I hope that the contents of the files are of some use, also bear in mind that the files are as dated in the bar graph on the down load page – I will try and produce a new data set every month or more frequently if time allows.

Please note these files are provided for personal use, if you want to use them for any other purpose or if you want to make them available through your own site – get in touch first.

 

 

My data, your data.

Anyone who has visited the downloads page on this site will have seen that there are a number of files available, these files are created by me from a number of sources and I intend to add more files over time.

The files are created from official sources and come with any mistakes contained in those official sources, just because it comes from the Federal Aviation Authority doesn’t actually mean that it is correct. What has to be taken into account is the fact that there are probably few checks on the data, that the data is input by individuals and there are many ways for the individual to missconstrue that data.

Take as an example the North American P-51D Mustang, almost all of them are using the USAAF assigned serial number instaed of the North American manufactiring serial number. In some cases the USAAF serial number is hyphenated in other cases not, the aitcraft detail is also sometimes hyphenated and sometimes not as in P51 or P-51. Not that this is a problem in the case of the P-51D as the MSN can be tied to the USAAF serial with relative simplicity, it is just an example of how even data from official sources can be a bit ambiguous.

The P-51 is also recorded as a number of types, each with its own identifier in the FAA database download, these were the official type identifiers – so we also have the F-51 hyphenated and not along with the F6A. There can be incorect manufacturer names, one that comes to ming is American Avia INC – where the type is redorded as a “North American P-51B”.

It generally doesn’t matter, it may to the purist but for most plane spotters all there needs to be is a way of differentiating between aircraft of the same type.

There are many examples of this type error scattered throughout official data sources, generally considered too big a task to rectify these things tend to be left as they are  – just for ease of keeping relatively accurate records. In my data I have not ammended the serial number just because of the amount of work, what about your data?

 

Support this site.

It does take some time and effort to create these downloads, also there are a number of costs associated with running the site. So if you can consider supporting this site with a donation it would be helpful, if you find the site useful then why not treat me to a doughnut – or even a doughnut and a coffee if you’re feeling really flush.

But regardless of whether you donate or not, I hope that the contents of the files are of some use, also bear in mind that the files are as dated in the bar graph on the down load page – I will try and produce a new data set every month or more frequently if time allows.

Please note these files are provided for personal use, if you want to use them for any other purpose or if you want to make them available through your own site – get in touch first.

 

 

ADSB Global Hiding

The FAA’s decision to allow the obfuscation of private aircraft identities is not unique; it aligns with practices in other countries that have implemented similar measures. This alignment reflects a broader trend in international aviation regulations, where privacy and security concerns are increasingly prioritised. Here’s a closer look at how international practices and standards influence the FAA’s decision:

European Union (EU).

Mode S Transponders.

In the EU, the use of Mode S transponders is mandatory for most aircraft. Mode S transponders emit a unique ICAO hex code that can be tracked. However, similar to the FAA, certain provisions allow for the use of temporary codes, especially for government, military, or state aircraft.

Data Privacy Regulations.

Europe has stringent data privacy laws, such as the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), which influences how personal data, including flight data, is handled. There is a growing recognition in Europe that private aircraft ownership and flight movements constitute personal data that may require protection.

State Aircraft.

EASA allows state aircraft, including military, police, and customs aircraft, to use reserved ICAO 24-bit addresses, which are not tied to the usual civilian databases, thereby masking their identity.

United Kingdom (UK).

Block All.

At the moment the UK doesn’t seem to have a system where the aircraft can transmit a false Mode S code, however it is probably just a matter of time before this facility is incorporated in the legislation. Altough again here the good thing from a spotters perspective is the glacial progress that will be made by the legislators, along with the ineptitude of the teams that will be doing the work – so don’t expect it to happen soon.

Military and Government Flights.

Like the U.S., the UK permits the obfuscation of identities for military and government flights for security reasons. This practice influences civil aviation policies, allowing for more flexible approaches to privacy.

Australia.

Aircraft Privacy Option.

Australia’s Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) provides an option for private aircraft owners to request privacy measures that limit the distribution of their aircraft’s identity and movement data. This is especially relevant for those who might face security risks.

State and VIP Aircraft.

Australia, like many other nations, allows state and VIP aircraft to use special codes that mask their identity for security and privacy purposes.

Canada.

National Defence and Private Aircraft.

In Canada, the Department of National Defence operates under specific regulations that permit the obfuscation of aircraft identities. Private aircraft owners also have some privacy protections, particularly in cases where there are security concerns.

NAV CANADA.

Canada’s air navigation service provider, NAV CANADA, supports privacy requests by limiting the display of certain aircraft on publicly accessible platforms.

International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Guidelines.

State Aircraft and Reserved Codes.

ICAO, the international body that sets standards for aviation, recognizes the need for certain aircraft to operate under conditions of confidentiality. This includes the use of reserved ICAO 24-bit addresses and special call signs for state aircraft, which include military, police, and other government-operated flights.

Global Cooperation.

ICAO encourages member states to cooperate on matters of airspace security and privacy. This international cooperation often influences domestic policies, leading to the adoption of practices like those implemented by the FAA.

Middle Eastern Countries.

Security-Centric Policies.

In several Middle Eastern countries, where security concerns are high, obfuscation of aircraft identities is a common practice. This is often done to protect high-profile individuals, including royalty and government officials, from being tracked.

Influence on FAA Policy.

International Norms.

The FAA often aligns its regulations with international norms to maintain consistency and facilitate cooperation with other countries. When multiple countries adopt privacy measures for aircraft, it sets a standard that the FAA is likely to follow.

Reciprocity and Harmonization.

International aviation operates on principles of reciprocity and harmonisation. The FAA’s decision to allow identity obfuscation can be seen as part of an effort to ensure that U.S. practices are in line or ahead of other leading aviation authorities, where practical it does make sense to move towards regulatory alignment.

Summary

So the global aviation environment will probably move towards allowing high net worth individuals to hide the identity of their private aircraft, if they don’t remove the markings like registration or serial number from the aircraft it won’t cause more than anoyance from a spotting perspective – as the information will propagate up the spotting grapevine.

Spotters as I’ve said tend to be a fairly communicative bunch, they have even established world wide networks where information regarding aircraft identities is disseminated quite effectively. There may always be the case where an identity can’t be confirmed, but it is likely that these will be few and far between.

Why have PIA codes.

PIA in action.

Firstly let me start this post by saying that I am not happy about the FAA’s PIA programme potentially going international, it will be a serious inconvenience for plane spotters – particularly those that are interested in Biz-Jets and military movements. But the programme is under way, currently active in US controlled air space.

And as I have already said it is likely to be extended to cover international airspace, which given the glacial speed of government agencies around the world will likely take quite a bit of time. After all there will have to be agreement on a standard then negotiations, followed by the ratification process and then it has to be signed into international law before it can be enacted.

There are a number of drivers for this programme, there is the personal safety and security issue that much has been made of in the press. There is also the fact that aircraft tracking data has been used as an additional tool to assist in industrial espionage, but pretty sure that will be easilly circumvented by someone who wants to know what a competitor is doing – but we should look at the cited reasons for this change instead of speculating.

Privacy Concerns.

High-Profile Individuals.

Owners of private jets and very high-profile individuals such as celebrities, executives, and government officials, often seek privacy to protect themselves from unwanted attention. In an environment where aircraft tracking websites make it easy for anyone to track flights, these individuals face risks related to stalking, harassment, or even corporate espionage.

Corporate Privacy.

Companies may use private aircraft for business operations, where they may wish to avoid disclosing their movements to competitors, which could reveal sensitive business activities, such as mergers, acquisitions, or other actions thsat they want to shield from the public gaze.

Security Considerations.

National Security.

Government and military-related flights may require obfuscation to maintain operational security. If the movements of certain aircraft are easily trackable, it could compromise national security or ongoing sensitive operations.

Personal Security.

Wealthy individuals or executives might be targeted for crime or terrorism. Obfuscating their aircraft identities can make it harder for malicious actors to track their movements and plan attacks.

Technological Advancements.

Increased Availability of Flight Tracking Tools.

The proliferation of flight tracking tools and apps that make real-time tracking of aircraft publicly accessible has made it easier for the general public to track private aircraft. This accessibility is percieved to heighten the need for privacy measures.

Data Aggregation.

Advanced data analytics can combine flight data with other publicly available information to create a detailed picture of an individual’s movements. Obfuscating call signs and ICAO hex codes is a response to these capabilities.

Regulatory and Industry Pressure.

Industry Lobbying.

The private aviation sector, including aircraft manufacturers, operators, and users, has lobbied for greater privacy protections. The industry recognises that clients value discretion and may push for regulatory changes that enhance privacy.

Balancing Transparency and Privacy.

The FAA needs to balance the public’s right to know with the legitimate privacy and security concerns of aircraft owners. Allowing obfuscation is a way to address this balance, providing privacy while still maintaining some level of regulatory oversight and safety.

Precedents and International Norms.

Global Practices.

The FAA’s decision aligns with practices in other countries where private aircraft owners are allowed to mask their identities for privacy or security reasons. International cooperation and standards often influence domestic policy decisions.

Previous Precedents.

The FAA has previously allowed certain flights, such as military or law enforcement, to use call signs that do not reveal their true identity. Extending similar protections to private aircraft is a natural progression.

Economic Considerations.

Attracting Business.

By offering privacy protections, the FAA makes the U.S. a more attractive environment for private aviation. High-net-worth individuals and corporations might prefer operating in jurisdictions where their privacy is respected.

Cost Implications.

The cost of implementing these measures is likely io be relatively low when weighed against the potential benefits, both in terms of privacy protection and maintaining the trust of the private aviation community.

Public Opinion and Legal Considerations.

Privacy Advocacy.

There is growing public and legal advocacy around privacy rights. The FAA’s move can be seen as part of a broader trend towards recognising and protecting the privacy rights of individuals and corporations.

Avoiding Legal Challenges.

By allowing obfuscation, the FAA might also be aiming to avoid potential legal challenges from aircraft owners who feel that their privacy rights are being infringed upon by public tracking systems.

In summary.

The FAA is trying to keep up with technology, as a result of pressure brought to bear by a number of high profile high net worth individuals and corporations. There are as can be seen a number of drivers for the PIA programme, especially given the FAA’s inability to control the reception of data transmitted in plain text by all aircraft as mandated in 2020.

 

Personal ICAO Address – International

Hiding Aircraft Identities – Internationally

As I have mentioned in earlier posts, the potential for anyone to hide their private aircraft and its use from public scrutiny is a reality. This will not make a significant difference to most people, however it will be somewhat anoying for aviation enthusiasts – whether you are a plane spotter or photographer.

The fact that the aircraft that you see on one of the flight tracking sites cannot be identified, may pique your interest or it may not. Although as a spotter I think it is more likely to be the former, finding out after the fact that something really interesting has been at the local field for a Gas and Go is likely to be quite annoying.

The “Robb Report” has a quite good article here which details some of the reasons, for those of you that do not want to read the report there is the following taken from the post on their site.

 

The FAA is trying to help. After ADS-B became mandatory in January of 2020, the agency created several programs that allow jet operators to opt out of sharing tail numbers, helping to conceal passenger identities. Many private owners signed up for the Limited Aircraft Display Data (LADD) program, but sources that don’t use FAA data aren’t obligated to obey those restrictions and can still publish the information emitted from a jet’s transponder.

The FAA moved to fix that loophole by creating a way to temporarily disguise a jet’s tail number through the Privacy International Civil Aviation Organization Address Program (PIA). But joining the program is significantly more complicated than signing up for LADD, requiring physical modifications to the transponder and temporary call-signs—and when it comes to the latter, “you’d likely need to change that code on a routine basis,” says Heidi Williams, NBAA’s director of air traffic services. Besides, the new codes are not recognized outside of US airspace.

Robb Report

 

This will just make tracking more difficult for the plane spotting community, I’m sure that certain of these aircraft will be identified quite quickly – by the local to the departure airfield spotters. But disseminating that information to the wider spotting community will not happen quickly.

The FAA has allocated some 50,000 of these Personal ICAO Addresses, other agencies are likely to make their own allocation. On the plus side, with the code ranges assigned to each country being known – you will be able to asses the nationality of the aircraft if nothing else.

If as is suggested in the report, there are negotiations in progress to allow the PIA to be applied internationally It is likely that there will be very few private jets that can be identified when using the aircraft trackers, after all these just display the information broadcast by the aircraft.

The next step would probably be ADS-Bx, where the transmissions are encrypted – making tracking any or all aircraft near impossible, I would say that this is a possibility, but on the plus site it is a good few years in the future.

 

As we’ve seen from broader celebrity culture, if there’s enough public interest, the trackers will find a way—the FAA can’t stop enthusiasts or paparazzi from physically watching jet traffic at a local airport and then sharing those tail numbers, for example. Spokesperson Tammy L. Jones says the agency is expanding PIA for US-registered aircraft to include FAA-managed international airspace, but that no mechanism currently exists to encrypt secondary surveillance and communication technology, and that modifying the next ADS-B generation could be a decade away.

Meanwhile, the NBAA is in talks with trade associations in Canada and the European Union, which account for 40 percent of global business-aviation activity, to create an international PIA-type program. But universal adoption would require “a conversation in every part of the globe on what this program means, and how it would interface with air-traffic-control systems,” says Carr. All of which leaves pilots like John King, whose wife was physically endangered, frustrated, angry and wondering: “Why should we have to give up our privacy whenever we get on an airplane?”

Robb Report

 

So is it just a matter of time, before the tracking tools and the sites like AirNav Radar Box become just so much baggage and of no use to a plane spotter or paparazzi.

 

Support this site.

It does take some time and effort to create the downloads available on this site for free, also there are a number of costs associated with running the site. So if you can consider supporting this site with a donation it would be helpful, if you find the site useful then why not treat me to a doughnut – or even a doughnut and a coffee if you’re feeling really flush.

But regardless of whether you donate or not, I hope that the contents of the files are of some use, also bear in mind that the files are as dated in the bar graph on the down load page – I will try and produce a new data set every month or more frequently if time allows. Currently being worked on are a number of lists for types, these are extracts from the US Civil register – these lists will be in a simple check list format or a Comma Separated Values file for these types.

Please note these files are provided for personal use, if you want to use them for any other purpose or if you want to make them available through your own site – get in touch first.